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Abstract 
The paper proposes several facts in support of the evidence that French banks actively 
manage their leverage. Impulse responses estimated from multivariate models allow 
assessing which balance sheet claims are used by banks to fine-tune their leverage. It is 
found that leverage adjustments are primarily attained through changes in domestic and 
foreign credit. The dynamic pattern of leverage is less affected by shocks to securities 
holdings, implying that the amplifying mechanism on the real economy that occurs via 
leverage adjustment is expected to work directly via bank credit rather than via asset 
markets. 
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1  Introduction  
According to monetary policy theory, banks directly transmit unexpected policy shocks 
exclusively through the bank lending channel of the credit view. Pioneered by [1], this 
channel describes the amplifying effect that banks have on the real economy through 
changes in credit supply, resulting from variations in liquidity provided by the central bank2. 
Studies on the bank lending channel have, however, showed that its empirical relevance is 
rather weak. In particular, this channel tends to fail whenever a bank is large and/or liquid 
([2]), has high capital ([3]), operates in a highly concentrated market ([4]), engages in 
securitisation ([5]) or has important foreign branches ([6]). Moreover, the burgeoning of 
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2Financial market frictions and imperfect substitutability between banks’ liabilities are the pre-
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non-banks financial institutions observed in the last two decades represents a further 
obstacle to the functioning of this channel. Indeed, even if bank loans can be successfully 
altered by the monetary policy shock, economic agents’ spending might be financed by 
other unregulated non-bank lenders, offsetting the desired effect of the central bank on 
economic activity.   
Nevertheless, the latest financial crisis has highlighted the strength of the inter-linkages 
between the banking sector and the real economy, leading many researchers to investigate 
the existence of alternative transmission channels in which banks have a prominent role 
([7]). Most of the attention has been devoted to the amplification mechanisms set off by the 
feedbacks between banks balance sheets and asset markets (a good survey is provided by 
[8]). A major contribution has been provided by [2] who have advanced the hypothesis that 
banks can amplify business cycle fluctuations via active leverage management. As the value 
of assets changes with cyclical conditions, and so does leverage, banks might, indeed, 
decide to actively act either to restore a desired fixed leverage threshold or to allow the 
leverage follow the cycle3. Indeed, book leverage, measured as total assets over net worth, 
if left unmanaged, is countercyclical: it falls during booms and increases during slumps. 
This is because the value of banks’ assets tends to be pro-cyclical4 and the net worth grows 
at a faster rate than total assets, assuming that the value of liabilities stays roughly constant. 
However, if leverage is actively managed, banks will increase (decrease) the leverage ratio 
during booms (slumps) amplifying business cycle fluctuations. 
Based on this very recent literature, this paper aims to test empirically whether cyclical 
variations in balance sheet size result in active leverage adjustment by banks for the French 
case. How leverage management takes place is also of central interest in this research. The 
expansion (reduction) of balance sheet size, which happens if banks decide to increase 
(decrease) their leverage during an economic boom (slump), can, indeed, be carried out in 
several ways. Banks might, for instance, increase (reduce) loans issuance having a direct 
effect on the real economy. Or, instead, they can decide to invest (fire-sale) in asset markets, 
putting pricing pressure on selected securities. In this case, the propagation effects caused 
by banks’ behaviour on the real economy are more complex and difficult to quantify as the 
transmission will work via asset prices and the net worth of the players in asset markets.  
This paper is the first attempt to focus exclusively on the pro-cyclicality of the French 
banking system. Available empirical evidence is primarily based on results obtained for a 
large panel of banks belonging to several European countries ([12]) or focusing on the 
Canadian ([13]) and German ([14]) banking systems.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the underpinnings of the liquidity 
channel and of the new financial accelerator. Section 3 provides some preliminary statistics 
on the balance sheet variables of French banks and in Section 4 multivariate models are 
formally estimated alongside relevant impulse response functions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
3The reasons why banks might decide to actively adjust their leverage are many and discussing them 
is out of the scope of this paper. [10] provide an extensive analysis on this issue. 
4In particular, [9] argue that the pro-cyclicality of assets is mainly due to the fact that a large portion 
of security claims are marked-to-market. The literature, however, proposes several other motives 
other than accounting standards for which banks balance sheets are pro-cyclical, most notably: Basel 
capital regulations and change in risk perception (see [11], for a survey). 
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2  The New Financial Accelerator 
The subprime financial crisis brought about a profound reconsideration on how the banking 
sector can transmit shocks to the real economy. The classical bank lending channel has, 
indeed, proved to be badly supported by empirical models mainly because the banking 
sector is little affected by monetary policy shocks, which are, hence, merely transmitted by 
banks to the real economy. Researchers have then focused their attention to other shocks 
(i.e. other than monetary policy ones) which might have a substantial impact on business 
cycle via the banking sector.  Most notably, a large consensus has been reached about the 
fact the roots of the observed amplifications of economic cycle via the banking sector are 
to be found in assets and funding markets dynamics.  
In [8] the liquidity channel is defined as the mechanism that transmits shocks from the 
banking system to the real economy which is set off by self-reinforcing mutual feedbacks 
between assets markets and banks’ balance sheets. As detailed formally in [15], the liquidity 
channel works in the following way: let’s assume that a drainage of liquidity in banks’ 
funding markets occurs and that this leads banks to fire sale their claims in order to meet 
their debt obligations. The consequential downward pressures in asset prices results in 
balance sheet corrosion for all those agents that hold the same assets who will, in turn, sell 
more assets depressing prices even further. When the liquidity channel is set off by this pro-
cyclical and self-reinforcing interaction between market and funding liquidity, i.e. the 
liquidity spiral, banks will be compelled to cut their lending to the economy. The 
mechanism also works in the reverse: during an economic boom, banks can expand their 
balance sheet at ease given the high liquidity in funding markets (and lower costs of 
borrowing), causing pricing inflation in some asset markets. Stronger balance sheets of 
economic agents will, in turn, put further inflationary pressure on asset prices and so on.  
Along the lines of [15], [9] have stressed that an initial shock to asset values (due to the 
liquidity spiral, the standard asset price channel5 or any other exogenous factor) can be 
amplified even more by the banking system, depending on whether banks actively adjust 
their leverage either pro-cyclically or to target a fixed level. This amplification mechanism 
set off by leverage adjustments has been referred to as the new financial accelerator by 
[10], as it is similar to the financial accelerator ([16]) but operates through banks’ net worth 
rather than through that of borrowers.  
[9] argue that the increase (decrease) in asset prices and in balance sheet size typically 
observed during an economic boom (recession) causes book leverage to fall6 (increase), if 
left unmanaged. This is particularly true for those agents, such as financial intermediaries, 
that have an important share of asset claims in their balance sheet that are valued at fair 
value. However, banks might actively adjust their leverage by further expanding (reducing) 
their balance sheet which, in turn, will magnify the effects of the cycle on the real economy 
and asset markets. In particular, if banks adjust their leverage by expanding their size 
through an increase in credit, then, shock are directly transmitted by banks to the real 
economy; if instead, banks expand their size via an increase in their securities holdings, 
then, the shock propagation to the real economy works through assets prices and markets’ 
                                                 
5See [17]. 
6A simple example can help clarify this. Leverage (lev) is equal to assets (a) to net worth (nw), i.e. 
assets minus liabilities (l). If a=100, l=90, then nw=10, then, leverage is equal to 10. Say assets 
increase in value by 10 then a=110, l=90 and nw=20. Leverage is now down to 5.5. 
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Figure 2: Cyclical fluctuations in real GDP and assets versus leverage 
Note: The cyclical component of the series is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter. Real assets and GDP (left-hand scale) are in logs, leverage (right-hand scale) in levels. 
Assets are deflated by the CPI (INSEE). 
 
This result is further confirmed by the striking positive relation between the annual growth 
rate of leverage and real assets (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Annual growth rates of assets and banking sector leverage 
Note: Annual growth rates are computed for quarterly data over the period 1998-2012. 
 
Granger causality tests (Table 1) also confirm the evidence of mutual feedbacks between 
leverage and total assets. Moreover, they reveal that mutual feedbacks between leverage 
and foreign loans, both with counterparties in the euro area and in the rest of the world. 
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Table 1: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
Notes: Four lags used for the Granger causality test. 
 
Cross-correlation analysis is a useful preliminary tool for understanding whether leverage 
adjustments by banks occur by fine-tuning the balance sheet size either in an orderly manner, 
(i.e. by fine-tuning a particular asset-side item) or in an unsystematic manner (i.e. by 
adjusting the whole composition of banks’ assets). Table 2 reports the cross-correlations of 
the cyclical component of leverage with that of several balance sheet asset-side variables.  
 
Table 2: Cross-correlations between the leverage cycle and the cyclical component of 
assets 
 
 
The cyclical component of total assets shows the highest correlation coefficient which 
reaches its peak at time t, implying the contemporaneous (i.e. intra-quarter) co-movement 
of the two cycles. The cross-correlation of the leverage cycle with other asset-side items, 
such as loans and securities are relatively lower, never reaching a coefficient higher than 
±0.4. In all cases the cross-correlations with the majority of other claims also reach their 
 Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
Total Assets does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,854 0,493
Leverage does not Granger Cause Total Assets 1,431 0,226
Total domestic credit does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,875 0,117
Leverage does not Granger Cause Total domestic credit 2,943 0,022
Loans to Euro Area does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,735 0,145
Leverage does not Granger Cause Loans to Euro Area 0,816 0,516
Loans to the rest of the world does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,766 0,138
Leverage does not Granger Cause Loans to the rest of the world 0,947 0,438
Interbank securities, Short-term does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,640 0,635
Leverage does not Granger Cause Interbank securities, Short-term 2,902 0,023
Interbank securities, Long-term does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,036 0,997
Leverage does not Granger Cause Interbank securities, Long-term 2,018 0,094
Mutual funds shares does not Granger Cause Leverage 3,126 0,016
Leverage does not Granger Cause Mutual funds shares 1,245 0,294
Securities issued by the private sector does not Granger Cause Leverage 2,591 0,038
Leverage does not Granger Cause Securities issued by the private sector 1,801 0,131
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peak at time t; this is probably due to the low frequency of the data. This evidence also 
indicates a very dynamic system in which balance sheet claims respond promptly to 
leverage changes. 
 
3.2 Empirical Impulse-response Analysis from a Multivariate Model 
Active leverage management is attained by banks through variations in both assets and 
liabilities. In particular, the process works in the following way. Let’s imagine that the value 
of some asset (A) increases, strengthening the balance sheet of banks having those assets 
among their claims. If the value of liabilities (L) stays roughly constant, then, book leverage 
(lev) will fall. Leverage is, indeed, equal to the following ratio: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣 =
𝐴
𝐴−𝐿
                                                             (1) 
 
If banks do not react to the change in asset prices, then, there is a negative relationship 
between the value of assets and leverage. If, instead, banks decide to restore a given 
leverage target ratio or to increase leverage in a pro-cyclical manner, then they will take on 
additional liabilities which allow the purchase of more assets.  
In order to understand the extent of shocks transmissions to the real economy via the 
banking system it is important to gauge which type of claims allow banks to fine-tune their 
leverage. If banks, for instance, choose to purchase selected securities that have markets 
which are not perfectly liquid, then, assets prices increase even further and leverage falls, 
as described above. Then, banks in order to restore their leverage will purchase even more 
assets, putting further pressure on asset prices. In this case, banks will transmit shocks to 
the real economy in a rather indirect way as the transmission mechanism will work mainly 
through changes in the net worth of financial counterparties caused by the increased 
demand for the asset.  
If banks, instead, choose to issue more credit to the private sector, then, the transmission to 
the real economy will be immediate and will resemble to the bank lending channel and the 
inter-linkages between asset markets and banks’ balance sheets will be weaker.  
Lastly, banks might have no predefined strategy to adjust the size of their balance sheet; in 
this case, an upward adjustment in assets will be achieved by increasing credit supply and 
assets holdings to different degrees.  
In order to establish how leverage is managed, selected impulse response functions are 
estimated from a Vector Auto Regressive model (VAR, [18]) for the French data. Given 
the large number of asset-side items which can be used by the banking system to adjust the 
leverage, several VARs are estimated. In particular, each VAR contains a set of fixed 
variables, that is, book-leverage, total banking assets and real GDP, to which is added one 
(or more) asset-side banking claim which varies with each model. The rationale behind the 
choice of the fixed variables are found in the model described in [9], as explained in the 
Section 2. Among the several banking claims considered, are found: domestic credit and to 
the banking sector, foreign loans (both to the euro area and the rest of the world), inter-bank 
securities (both short and long term) and other claims (such as securities issued by the 
private sector, mutual funds and other shares). Summary statistics on all the endogenous 
variables considered are found in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Source: Banque de France. Balance sheet variables are expressed in millions, Real GDP 
in billions. 
 
The endogenous variables included in multivariate models are in log-levels in order to allow 
for implicit cointegration relations between the series. Impulse responses are generated 
based on each of the VARi(pi) model of the following form: 
 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑋𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜑 + 𝜀𝑡                                               (2) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑡
𝑖  is a vector of endogenous variables, 𝜑 is a constant term and 𝜀𝑡 is a vector 
of white noise disturbances. The vector 𝑋𝑡
𝑖  includes the following variables: 
 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡;  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡; 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡; 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡
𝑖 )                         (3) 
 
Table 4 reports the specifications and model adequacy tests for each VARi(pi) model7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7Tables with models’ estimated parameters are available from the author upon request.  
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Table 4: VARi(pi) models specifications 
 
 
The six models have unit roots smaller than one and disturbances behave fairly well. The 
LM test for serial correlation indicates no autocorrelation at 5% confidence level in all 
models; however, the White test reveals some heteroskedasticity in a limited number of 
models.    
Models in (1) are used to estimate generalised impulse response functions (Pesaran and 
Shin, 1996), which allow estimating the dynamic pattern of a variable xt to a shock to 
another system’s variable through orthogonal innovations which are invariant to variable 
ordering. 
In order to understand how the balance sheet is adjusted to fine-tune the leverage pro-
cyclically, it is of primary importance to analyse the dynamic pattern of leverage following 
shocks in different asset-side variables. However, beforehand, a check test of (1) is 
necessary to confirm that the model estimated adequately supports the variables’ dynamics 
as described in Section 2 and the stylised facts advanced in Section 3. Figures 4.a and 4.b 
report the estimated responses of the systems’ variables when assets and leverage are 
shocked.   
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Figure 4.b: Generalised impulse response functions with respect to a one-standard 
deviation shock to Leverage 
 
Figure 4.a: Generalised impulse response functions with respect to a one-standard 
deviation shock to Total Assets 
 
Note: Figures 4.a and 4.b show the accumulated responses of the variables in the system 
following a one-standard deviation positive shock to the structural error of the total assets 
and leverage equations respectively. The endogenous variables included in the VAR(4) in 
logs are: leverage, total assets, total domestic credit and real GDP. Monthly data covers 
the period 1997-2012. Details of the estimated VAR(4) model are reported in Table 4, 
specification 1. 
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The impulse response functions shown refer to the specification of model (1) in which 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡
𝑖  is total domestic credit; nevertheless, impulse responses are broadly robust 
among models. Figure 4a shows the cumulated generalised impulse responses to a one 
standard deviation shock in total assets, equal to about 1.6% increase on impact. The shock 
causes a contemporaneous and significant increase in leverage of about 1.5%. The effect 
on leverage increases over the 24-months horizon, following closely the dynamic path of 
the exogenous shock in total assets, increasing by as much as 20%. This evidence supports 
the fact French banks actively adjust their leverage as an unexpected shock to asset value 
has a positive and significant effect on leverage. 
Figure 4.b shows the cumulated generalised impulse responses to an exogenous shock to 
leverage. The estimates show a positive and significant effect of total assets which, in 
cumulated terms, reaches over 25% after 2 years.  
The insignificant effect on real GDP in both cases is surely due to the fact that shocks to 
banking assets and leverage have an indirect effect on the real economy via selected 
banking claims, the net worth of borrowers and/or asset markets. Overall, the evidence 
showed in Figures 4.a and 4.b confirms the existence of mutual feedbacks between banking 
leverage and total assets as suggested by the preliminary analysis in the previous section.  
Figure 5 reports the generalised impulse responses of leverage when shocking the asset-
side item(s) 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡
𝑖  in each of the seven VARi(pi) models (see Table 4 for 
specification). As previously mentioned, this approach allows understanding which type of 
claim banks typically use to adjust their leverage.  
 
196                                                       Carmela D’Avino 
 
Figure 5: Generalised impulse response functions of leverage in various models with 
respect to a one-standard deviation shocks to selected claims 
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Figure 5 (continued): Generalised impulse response functions of leverage in various 
models with respect to a one-standard deviation shocks to selected claims 
 
Model 1 includes as asset claim all domestic credit. As it can be noticed in the top graph of 
Figure 5, a one-standard deviation shock to domestic credit (to all sectors) has a positive 
and significant effect to leverage which increases by about 6% after one year. When the 
two sub-categories of total domestic credit are considered separately into credit to the 
private sector and to the banking sector (Model 2) it can be noticed that credit to the private 
sector has a relatively larger effect on leverage than the latter. Altogether, these pieces of 
evidence suggest that a shock to credit to the private sector has a relatively large effect on 
leverage. When considering foreign loans, split into loans to the euro area and to the rest of 
the world (Model 3), it can be noticed that also these variables have a relatively large 
positive effect on leverage. In particular, a positive shock to loans to the rest of the world 
causes leverage to increase by 20% after 2 years. On the other hand, the response of 
leverage to shocks in interbank claims, both short and long term maturities, is rather small 
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and significant only within the first six months of the horizon (model 4). Shocks to 
securities issued by the private sector (model 5) and mutual funds shares (model 6) see no 
significant response on leverage. Therefore, the evidence proposed in Figure 5 shows that 
the increase in leverage occurs mainly through the increase in credit, both domestic and 
foreign. This implies that the transmission channel activated by banks’ leverage 
adjustments barely works thorough asset markets and thus, should not put considerable 
pressures on asset prices. The effect on asset prices might only be indirect through 
borrowers’ investment decisions and the self-reinforcing spiral between asset size and 
leverage spiral should not be relevant.   
 
 
4  Conclusion 
Understanding whether the banking system in a country actively adjusts its leverage with 
the business cycle is of crucial importance to gauge the strength of the linkages between 
the financial and the real sectors. This is mostly true for those countries in which a liquidity 
channel is potentially important as banks, the real sectors and assets markets can be 
particularly interrelated.   
This paper provides evidence on pro-cyclical leverage management practices by the French 
banking system. The results point to a limited role of banks to amplify business cycle 
fluctuations via assets markets and to self-reinforcing feedbacks between the leverage and 
the credit cycles. Pro-cyclical leverage adjustments occur mainly through traditional loans, 
suggesting that business cycle fluctuations are directly amplified via claims to the private 
sector. Furthermore, leverage is also actively adjusted through foreign claims, suggesting 
the set-off of an international propagation channel via cross-border bank lending.  
The mutual feedbacks that exist between balance sheet size and leverage for the French 
case, therefore, are not entirely explained by the mechanism by [9] in which banks, when 
adjusting actively their leverage put significant pricing pressure on assets markets, setting 
off mutual feedbacks between bank leverage and asset markets.  
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